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THE PREMIUM DATE OF A MISSOURI
LIFE INSURANCE'POLICY
ORRIN B. EvANS*

1. Tke Battlefield
The prospective applicant for life insurance must decide for himself
a very considerable number of important questions before he completes his
application. Once the policy is issued, at least if it is an "old line" policy
free from restrictions on travel and occupation, and the chances are good
that it is, ordinarily his only concern is to pay the recurring premiums on or
before their due date. It would seem a simple matter to define the conditions
he must satisfy, so that he might know precisely how much he must pay
and when, but as the cases stand in Missouri today, it would be a bold
lawyer who asserted positively the premium date on a good many of the
policies outstanding. To put it another way, a great many Missouri policy
holders cannot know exactly what they must do to keep their life insurance
in force.
The premium date is uncertain whenever the policy, or the application
incorporated into the policy, provides that the insurance shall not become
effective until the policy is delivered to the applicant during his good health
and the first premium paid; and that is true although the policy bears the
date of its execution at the home office of the insurer and refers to the
anniversary of that date as the premium date. Unquestionably the more
recent decisions of the supreme court permit the parties to agree to any
premium date they choose specifically, one that first arrives less than a year
after the policy becomes effective-and in these opinions it is said that the
uncertainty here asserted to exist in all such contracts will not be found if
the language employed is unambiguous. Of course, if contracting parties
insist upon using equivocal terminology, uncertainty is inherent by definition.
I believe, however, that an examination of the cases will demonstrate the
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. More than forty cases involve this precise issue.
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accuracy of the broader statement. Missouri lawyers, who are neither knaves
nor fools, have not been able to tell what language will be regarded as
ambiguous and have shown their perplexity by carrying their cases to the
appellate tribunals even more frequently than have their brethren in other
jurisdictions.2
It is readily understandable why insurers writing old line policies want
to defer liability until the first premium has been paid. Not only are the
premiums calculated by discounting the interest to be earned upon premiums
payed "in advance" but any delay in payment after the risk is taken will
inevitably result in a less favorable mortality experience than was assumed
in the actuarial tables, for thqse assureds who realize loss during the interim
of delay will certainly pay up the premium and assert the liability of the
insurer while a percentage of those incurring no loss will never take up the
policies. In as much as it is not practically possible for the applicant to pay
the premium at the exact moment the policy is approved at the home office,
he must either pay in advance, with the consequent slight loss of "use" of
his money until the policy is issued or the premium returned, or agree to
postponement of the assumption of risk until he pays after the policy issues.
If the latter alternative is chosen, why should not the local agent of the
insurer, who delivers the policy and collects the first premiums, be authorized to insert the date of the policy, on the anniversary of which the next
premium will be payable? It may be reckless to speculate about trade custom,
which often has become accepted trade practice without any attempt to reevaluate the conditions under which it first arose, but it seems quite probable
that the underlying reason is a firm determination on the part of the insurers
not to let selling agents have any authority whatsoever to determine any
of the terms of the contract-including even the filling in of blank dates.
Agents selling on commission do not have complete identity of interest with
their principals, as insurers have found by experience. Moreover, if the policy
should become effective as of delivery and the receipt of the first premium,
and the next premium not be due until the full quarterly, semi-annual, or
annual anniversary thereof, there will be a few days (between the time of
the receipt by the agent and the completed transmission to the home office
where investments are made) when the premium is not available for the

2. Cases are collected in notes (1920) 6 A.L.R. 774, (1922) 22 A.L.R. 1253,
(1932) 80 A.L.R. 957, and (1937) 111 A.L.R. 1420.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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production of income, although the risk is being carried the whole period.
All in all, dating the policy at the time of its execution at the home office
and providing for subsequent premiums to be payable on the anniversary
thereof, can hardly be considered reprehensible conduct on the part of the
insurer, even though the inception of the risk is postponed until the first
premium is paid.
There seems to be little justification for the additional condition of
delivery in good health, however. It is vicious in every respect and as
construed and applied in Missouri, it resurrects much of the ancient doctrine
of warranty generally supposed to be obliterated by statute. One who
represents in his application that he is in good health should be understood
as stating only that he is in good health so far as he knows. Inserted as a
condition of acceptance, however, it must be literally satisfied, regardless
of the applicant's ignorant good faith3 (and possibly, regardless of the actual
relationship of the latent disease to the ultimate mortality).4 Not only does
it, in conjunction with dating of the policy at the time of earlier execution at
the home office, "short-change" the insured on his first period of insurance;
it gives the insurer the benefit of a more favorable experience than the
probabilities upon which the premium was calculated. It is unnecessary
to the insurer even in industrial policies written without physical examination, for the condition of the applicant's health can be ascertained by the
agent as fairly at the time of application as at the time of delivery of the
policy, and if a rule of selective risks is to modify the experience table based
purely on age, health on the date when the applicant's insurance age is
fixed, which is not the date when the policy is delivered, should be the
determining factor. Understandably, courts have fought to escape from
the harshness of its strictures, but the law would be more clearly delineated
if the legislature would simply invalidate such conditions.5

3. Kirk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 765, 81 S.W. (2d) 333 (1935);
Lipel v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.W. (2d) 871 (Mo. App. 1946).
4. While the decisions apparently hold that the Missouri "material misrepresentation" statute (Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 584) which in term applies only
to "misrepresentation made in obtaining or securing" life insurance is applicable
to "delivery-in-sound-health" clauses, which are conditions of acceptance of the offer,
the distinction made in the recent cases cited supra note 3, suggests the validity
of a distinction on materiality as well as intent. Cases are collected in comment
(1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 338, note 26.
5. In some states the medical certificate of the examining physician is conclive of the applicant's health. See note (1932) 8 Wis. L. REv. 377. There is
no evidence that these statutes have worked to the prejudice of the reasonable
interests of insurer.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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Something could be said for a legislative policy making insurance writing
a common calling, with all insurance written on the basis of comprehensive
mortality tables which reflect the poor as well as the selected risks and
compelling insurance carriers to accept all applicants. Of course, the preferred risks would pay more for their insurance than they do now, but it
might be argued that the country has an interst in seeing that protection
is available to the dependents of poor risks, and there would be real social
advantages in being able to buy life insurance, like fire insurance, over the
counter and effective immediately. At any rate, such a policy is not the law,
and as long as insurance writers can select from among the applicants the
risks they will accept, as a practical matter it becomes necessary to refer
all applicants to a central office for decision. This means delay and from the
delay come the problems dealt with in this paper.
a. Binder Receipts
It would seem that a solution might be found in more extensive use of
binder receipts, issued at the time of the physical examination and receipt
of the first premium. Though the terminology of the binder receipts is
somewhat more elaborate, in essence it should be an agreement that the
applicant is insured from that moment, either unconditionally for a limited
period, or conditionally if, on the basis of his application and physical
examination, he is at that time an insurable risk under the established rules
of the insurer for the amount and kind of insurance applied for. If the
binder receipt is to serve the only purpose for which it can be given in good
faith, the officials of the home office must (a) have surrendered their
authority to exercise an arbitrary discretion in the selection of individual
applicants and (b) have authorized the local agents to bind the company,
subject at most only to subsequent testing of the "insured's" (sic) insurability by strictly objective standards established and applied to facts exisiting at the time of the "binding." This testing will normally be made at the
home office by experts with less personal bias than the selling agent and
in a better position to apply the standards uniformly and with appreciation
of the company's over-all carriage of risks. If the local agent is not given
the authorization so defined, if real discretion is reserved to the home office
to reject the applicant on the basis of subjective standards, the so-called
"binder receipt" is no "binder" at all and is a worse fraud than the judicially
criticized practice of dating the policy at the time of execution and postponing
assumption of risk until delivery in good health.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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Suppose that A, a fine specimen of young manhood, of exemplary
character and roseate prospects, applies for a straight life policy, is examined,
pays the first premium, and is issued a binder receipt. Suppose that he is
accidentally killed before the application is approved and the policy executed
at the home office. May the insurer deny liability? This is the acid test
of the effect of the binder receipt, and we have no positive answer in Missouri.
In Wolfskill v. American Union Life Ins. Co.," the Kansas City Court of
Appeals ruled 7 against the insurer, the receipt in that case reading "if a full
first premium.., has been paid at the time of making such application and
declaration of such payment is made therein, the insurance, subject to the
terms and conditions of the policy contract applied for and in use by the
company of this date, shall take effect on the date hereof, provided the
application is completed as agreed therein, and provided the applicant is on
this date a risk acceptable to the company under its rules, on the plan, and
for the amount and at the rate of premium declared paid, and provided
further the applicant is on the date in good health. .. "
In State ex el. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U. S. v. Robertson8 the
binder receipt read, "Contract shall take effect as of the date of this receipt,
provided the applicant is on this date in the opinion of the society's authorized
officers in New York, an insurable risk under its rules and the application is
otherwise acceptable on the plan and for the amount applied for." When the
application was inspected in New York, the premium was rated up five years
because the application showed the habitual use of intoxicants, although the
physical examination indicated good physical condition. The applicant
committed suicide before the rated-up policy was delivered. The supreme
court, en banc, ruled for the insurer, holding that there was no completed
contract of insurance. The applicant was not, in the opinion of the officers
in New York, an acceptable risk at the premium applied for, and the applicant had never acceded to the counter-offer of the policy on the rated-up
premium. The opinion does not discuss the question of whether the applicant's insurability for the amount and plan and at the premium applied for

6. 172 S.W. (2d) 471 (Mo. App. 1943).
7. The decision was positive on this point, although judgment below against
the insurer was reversed because of variance between pleading and proof. The
Court of Appeals made the point that the insurer should be permitted to introduce
evidence that the applicant was not, at the time of application, insurable by its
rules.
8. 191 S.W. 989 (Mo. 1917).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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had to be judged by objective rules. As the original application had been
rejected and the counter offer approved at the home office before notice of
the applicant's death was received,' it may be presumed that the officers
acted in good faith and in accordance with accepted practice. The case
is not much authority on the liability of the insurer prior to the issuance
of the policy where the risk is plainly insurable, although the court did say,
"Had the New York officers of the company approved the entire application,
as it approved Kempf as an insurable risk, then unquestionably he would
have been insured from that date, although ill health or death may have
overtaken him prior to the issuance of the policy."' 0 It is hard to see how
he could have been insured from the date of application although death
might have overtaken him prior to the issuance of the policy unless the
company was bound, at least in some measure, to issue the policy, or, to put
it another way, unless the company was not at liberty to reject the application arbitrarily. The only other meaning which can be given to the quoted
sentence would make the liability of the company depend upon whether
it had happened to issue the policy before it learned of his prior death, an
absurd result. The court goes on, "In other words, his contract of insurance
was conditional, depending upon the company's acceptance of him as an
insurable risk, and its approval of his application for the insurance as
presented to it by him." Now it is quite evident that the contract of insurance
said to be conditional could not be the policy ultimately to be issued. It
must be the "contract" made by the binder receipt and there can be no
contract unless the insurer is bound to some degree. As the only action
by the insurer prior to passing upon the application was through the soliciting
agent, if there was any contract, it must be because the soliciting agent
had authority to bind the company, even though to but a limited degree.
It will have been observed that the wording of this receipt differed from
that before the court in the Wolfskill case, in that it conditioned the assumption of the risk upon the applicant's insurability under the insurer's rules
"inthe opinion of the society's authorized officers in New York." Even the
literal construction of such language limits the scope of the officer's discretion
to "insurability under its rules," however, and it is surely not unreasonable
to insist upon an honest opinion on that point. A denial of the application
because the applicant was no longer insurable when the application was acted
9. Possibly before the injury and death occurred.
10. 191 S.W. 989, 992 (Mo. 1917).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1

6

Evans: Evans: Premium Date of a Missouri

PREMIUM DATE OF MISSOURI POLICY
upon is not an opinion of the officers upon his insurability at the time
application was taken. Even under such a binder receipt, the action of
officers at the home office is not the acceptance of an offer to take
insurance; it is but evidence of a fact-i.e., their honest opinion of

the
the
out
his
insurability under their rules, for the policy and in the amount and at the
premium applied for, which fact was a condition of the insurance effected
by the binder receipt.
Several cases" coming to the federal courts for Missouri have involved
receipts worded in this fashion: "Any insurance effected shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions of this policy granted, and by reason
of this payment shall be binding and in force from the date of the medical
examination; provided, said application shall be duly approved and accepted at the home office .... 12 Literally, such a receipt is no binder at all,
for it imposes no limitations upon the insurer's arbitrary right to refuse to
issue the policy, upon the issuance of which the immediate insurance is said
to depend. It is nothing but an excuse for antedating the policy which may
be executed and to say that competent persons are free to contract as they
please on that point simply ignores the generally admitted facts that laymen applicants do not deal on an equal level with the professional insurers,
that they might easily be misled by such language, that their misconceptions
are often encouraged by the efforts of the insurers' selling agents, and that
they suppose they are getting something for their money. The federal cases
just referred to denied the interim liability of the insurer, using language
much broader'13 than the facts involved required and relying ultimately upon
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mutual Life Insurance
4 a case in which (a) a promissory
Co. of N. Y. v. Young's Administrators,1
note and not cash had been delivered by the applicant and (b) the injury
11. Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 115 Fed. 81 (C.C.A. 8th, 1902);
Drake v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 21 F. (2d) 39 (C.C.A. 8th, 1927);
Brancato v. National Res. Life Ins. Co., 35 F. (2d) 612 (C.C.A. 8th, 1929). The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th circuit has reached the same conclusion in
other cases not involving Missouri law. Perhaps they are of equal significance or of
equally little significance today, for the decisions cited, having been rendered in
the pre-Erie R.R. v. Tompkins era, were based on "general" law.
12. Brancato v. Nat. Res. Life Ins. Co., 35 F. (2d) 612, 613 (C.C.A. 8th,
1929).
13. "Binding receipts substantially like the one relied upon by the appellant
have received frequent consideration by the courts, and it is settled 'that the right
reserved to the insurance company to accept or reject the application for insurance
referred to in the receipt is absolute. Such binding receipts leave it within the power
of the company wholly to rejectwithout giving any reason . .

."

Ibid.

14. 90 U.S. 85 (1874), acutely analyzed by Prof. Havighurst, Life Iitsurance
Binding Receipts (1938) 33 ILL. L. REV. 180.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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resulting in his death was suffered after the application had been rejected
at the home office by making a counter offer in the form of a different
policy.
In dealing with receipts bf this character, it might be pertinent to ask,
could the applicant withdraw his application and insist upon return of the
premium at any time prior to the execution and delivery of the contemplated policy? From the standpoint of the insurance carrier, one of the
incentives for issuing binder receipts is protection against business loss when
the applicant seeks to withdraw after overhead in the way of medical examination and administrative expense has been incurred.1, Some receipts explicitly deny the applicant's right to return of his money unless the policy
is refused, while others merely state that the money will be returned if
the application is not accepted. Depending upon the approach to the subject, provision for retention of the premium may be either ineffectual for
want of consideration or the basis for implying a promise of indemnification
to supply the mutuality otherwise lacking. There have been few cases involving attempts to rescind the application but the South Dakota Supreme
Court has held the insurer liable for interim loss on the reasoning suggested.1 0
The most recent binder receipt case from our supreme court is Bearup
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S.1 Some time after the policy containing
a double-indemnity-for-accidental-death clause had been issued, the insured
killed himself while insane. Such death is accidental by Missouri law but
not by New York law. The court held New York law controlling, arguing
that the binder receipt dispensed with the necessity of delivery (which
would otherwise have placed the last act necessary to a completed contract
in Missouri) but that by its terms (which were identical with those in the
Robertsoz case) the insurance was not effective unless the officers in New
York approved the application, thus fixing New York as the place of contracting.1 - The application form contained the further provision that only
15. It is well settled that in the absence of a binder, at least, the applicant
can (a) refuse to proceed with his application and reject the policy tendered and
(b) recover any premium paid in advance, until the time the risk attaches.
16. 'Albers v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 170 N.W. 159

(1918).
17. 351 Mo. 326, 172 S.W. (2d) 942 (1943).

18. Accord, Bowen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Mo.
1940); Pickett v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 27 S.W. (2d) 452 (Mo. App.
1930); Fields v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 118 S.W. (2d) 521 (Mo. App.
1938). Contra, Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 151 Mo. 604, 52 S.W. 356
(1899) although more satisfactory reasoning than that employed by Judge Valiant
might have been found.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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the officers in New York could make or vary the contract. Granting that
a conflict of laws case is a useful precedent in other situations to but a limited
degree, the opinion may be significant in indicating the court's approach to
the effect of the binder receipt. There is nothing to suggest that the court
thought the insurer might in fact and law have authorized its local agent to
bind it, despite its assertions to the contrary in the application., Such assertions would eliminate any question of apparent authority but could hardly
conclude inquiry into actual delegation of authority. Nor is there anything
to suggest that the court would not construe the language of the receipt
literally, permitting the exercise of uncontrolled discretion by the officers
at home in accepting or rejecting applications. The case can be criticized
as a mechanical and extreme application of the place-of-contracting rule of
conflict of laws, for certainly the Missouri contacts seem the more significant. If there had been no binder receipt, Missouri law would have applied
because of the necessity of delivery here, 20 although the same, or greater,
discretion could have been exercised by the New"York officers as a necessary
element in the contract. Because a binder receipt was issued in Missouri,
purporting to give coverage from the moment of its issuance, the insurance
contract lost its Missouri identity. However, we are at this time more con-

19. In Patterson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 23 S.W. (2d) 198 (Mo. App. 1930),
insurer's agent solicited applicant's mother to take out insurance on his life. She had
but three dollars with her at the time, which she gave to the agent, receiving a
binder receipt in the only form which he had with him at the time. It read, "Received from Mrs. Patterson the sum of $3.00, being the payment of ............ week's
premium on account of an Industrialpolicy applied for ... if death occur after the
date hereof, and of the application from which this receipt is detached and prior

to the issue of such policy, payment of the amount thereof in accordance with and
subject to the conditions and agreements therein contained shall be made, provided
the insured was in sound physical health on the date of the application." (Italics
added.) In fact, the application from the receipt was detached was not used; the
application presently made was for, and on a form for, "whole life" insurance, and
it in turn provided that if the entire first premium of $9.17 was paid in advance,

the insurance should be effective immediately if the application was approved at
the home office. The applicant was accidentally killed before the execution of any
policy. In denying recovery, the court held there was no evidence of either real
or apparent authority in the agent to bind the defendant for the kind of insurance
actually applied for, at least in the absence of payment of the full first premium.
In so far as suit was based upon the binder receipt given, such binder was conditioned upon a non-existent fact, the applicationfor industrial insurance. The case

does not hold that the agent with authority to issue the binder receipt for an industrial policy did not have authority to bind the company from the moment of that
type of application and there is some intimation that he would. And see Horton v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 151 Mo. 604, 617, 52 S.W. 356 (1899).
20. Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 50 S.W. 519 (1899),
aff'd 178 U.S. 389 (1899); Horton v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 151 Mo. 604, 52 S.W. 356
(1899).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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cerned with the suggestion that the receipt had no binding force of itself,
implicit in the court's argument that there was no contract of any kind until
the company's authorized officers acted in New York. The analysis of binder
receipts which I have heretofore urged treats them as but one part of a
single and entire contract of insurance, of which the binder receipt is the
temporary and incomplete evidence and the policy ultimately issued the
permanent and complete evidence. That analysis is based upon the proposition that the policy is not the contract, or essential to a contract, but is
merely evidence of the contract. It is quite possible to find two separate
contracts, the first for interim insurance until the application is acted upon
(or for a definite number of days, if the binder receipt is so phrased), the
second for the term of the policy issued and taking effect at that time.
Indeed, some binder receipts are explicitly written in this fashion. The interim insurance is supported by the company's right to retain the first premium until it passes upon the application despite the possibility of the
applicant's desire to rescind, or, as Professor Havighurst puts it,21 "the
temporary insurance is thus in effect the consideration for an option given
to the company to accept or reject the application ... "
Such interim insurance may be unconditional, in which case it makes no
difference whether the applicant was, at the time of application, insurable
for the amount, kind of policy, and at the premium applied for under the
company's rules; he is insured in any event for the period specified, or until
the company passes upon the application, subject only to the defense of
misrepresentation or fraud in obtaining the binder receipt. Binder receipts
plainly written in this form22- offer certain administrative advantages. They
remove the necessity of deciding whether the applicant was insurable at the
time of medical examination; whether the company acts in good faith on his
application. They eliminate any ambiguity in regard to the applicant's
status while his application is being passed upon, as there is no 'unc pro
tunc feature. The objection from the insurer's standpoint is that they re181.

21. Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts (1938) 33 ILL. L.

REV. 180,

22. The following form is stated by Professor Goble to be in use (GonLIn,
(1931) p. 42, n. 9). "Received the sum of ............
dollars, being
the first premium on a policy of assurance on the life of ................
(kind and amount
of policy applied for.) In consideration of the representations and agreements contained in the said application, and of the payment of the above sum, the abovementioned life is assured, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the policy
which may be granted in this particular case, for 30 days from the present date.
Should the company decline to issue the policy, the assurance hereby granted thereupon cases, and in such case the amount herein acknowledged sh'all be returned
to the applicant."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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quire even more delegation of authority to the soliciting agent than do other
honest binder receipts of the conditional type, as the agent must decide on
his own responsibility whether temporary insurance is to be in force.
If the binder receipt be regarded as creating a separate contract for
interim insurance, albeit a conditional contract, we can perhaps minimize
the effect of the customary statements in application and policy that selling
agents may not contract for the company, by restricting the reference of
the statements to the policy to be issued and to constitute a second and
separate contract. Such analysis also serves to restrict the breadth of the
Robertson, Young, and Bearup cases as precedent. Clearly in Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Young's Administrators, probably in State ex rel Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Robertson, the application had been rejected,, thus terminating the interim insurance, before injury to the applicant. The policy sued upon in Bearup v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S.
may more easily be regarded as executed in New York, and as representing
a New York contract, if it be deemed a contract distinct from the interim
insurance. However, it seems to me the more natural reading of the binder
receipts which have been before the Missouri courts shows a single contract,
continuous from the time of application. Such a reading also seems to me
more in accord with the actuarial practice of the insurers, who in such
cases calculate the premiums on the basis of the age of the applicant at the
time of application.
At any rate, it should be quite apparent that if the receipt does not bind
the insurer from the moment it is given, he will obtain the benefit of specially
favorable mortality experience not reflected in the premium and will retain
a premium for which no proportionate insurance coverage is provided.
There is no law that insurance premiums must be payable at regularly
recurring dates throughout the life of the policy, or that the first premium
may not be larger than subsequent premiums. The greater part of the
overhead in writing the policy is incurred in the first year and much could
be said for a system putting a larger portion of that cost on the first premium. 2 3 However, the doctrine of "open covenants openly arrived at" is
good morals in private as well as international law, and binder receipts
which do not bind simply delude the applicant, both as to the state of his
coverage at the moment and as to the amount of insurance he ultimately
23. This is what is accomplished, though not openly, by the preliminary
term-whole life policies discussed infra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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gets for his money (for in these cases there is no actual reduction in subsequent premiums to compensate for the extra charge on the first).
Until the effect of the binder receipt as an instrument of immediate insurance is conclusively determined in Missouri,24 it is not possible to state
its influence on the due date of the second and subsequent premiums. The
question was potentially present in Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 25

but the decision went on the ground that the parties by their conduct had demonstrated their own interpretation of the policy. In Johnson
v. American CentralLife Insutrance Company,20 the so-called binder receipt

recited that in consideration of the payment of the first premium at the time
of application, the policy should be in force from the time of approval of the
application by the medical director. However, the policy ultimately issued
provided that it should not be effective until delivered to the applicant
during his good health. In holding that subsequent premiums were not due
until the anniversary of the delivery of the policy, the court relied primarily
on the doctrine that ambiguities should be construed against the insurer
who prepared the contract. Neither court nor counsel seemed very certain
of the significance of the receipt, and the decision seems quite justified to
me, for the insurer was apparently playing both ends against the middle
in most extreme fashion. However, the court made the unnecessary observation that the binder receipt could hardly control the terms of the policy
subsequently issued. Presumably, a binder receipt which expressly and
unequivocally insured the applicant from the moment of application on
the terms of the policy to be issued could not be vitiated by a condition in
the standard policy of the insurer that the insurance doesn't take effect
until delivery of the policy during the good health of the applicant; if the
applicant died pending the execution of the policy, the insurer should be
liable. And if the applicant did not die, and a policy were in fact issued to,
him containing such a restriction on the date of effectiveness, it still could
hardly be argued that he would not get a full year's insurance for his full
first premium unless the second premium date were postponed until the
anniversary of delivery of the policy. There would still remain the question
of the definiteness with which the subsequent premium dates were designated
by the entire contract, and the decision of the instant case, rendered during
24.
44 YALE
25.
26.

For cases in other states, see notes (1938) 33 ILL. L. REV. 180, (1935)
L. J. 1223, (1935) 81 A.L.R. 332, (1937) 107 A.L.R. 194.
336 Mo. 724, 81 S.W. (2d) 313 (1935).
249 S.W. 115 (Mo. App. 1922).
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the period between Halsey v. Amercan Central Life Insurance Co.27' and
Prange v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.,28 should be confined to the facts
°"
recited in the opinion.2

2. The Battle Lines Are Formed
Halsey v. American Central Life Ins. Co., decided by Division 1 of the
Missouri Supreme Court in 1914, was the first case in this jurisdiction to deal
wfth the question to which this paper is addressed, and the decision of that
case established a doctrine which, though not confined to this state, was for
a time at least primarily associated with it.' The application for life insurance had been made and was dated May 24, 1906; the policy was executed and dated at the home office in Indianapolis on May 31, 1906; and
the policy was delivered to the insured at his home in Missouri on June 5,
1906, at which time the first premium was paid. The second premium was
tendered and refused on May 31, 1907. The insured died June 5, 1907. In
view of the subsequent interpretation of the decision in the case, it is necessary to set out the exact language of the contract at some length. The
application read, "I, Augustus C. Halsey, of St. Louis, Mo., hereby propose to insure my life with the American Central Life Insurance Co. to
the amount of ten thousand dollars .... The annual premium to be made
payable in advance on the 24th day of May.... I hereby expressly agree
that there shall be no contract of insurance until a policy shall have been
issued and delivered to me when in good health and the premium paid to
said company or its duly authorized agent during my lifetime .... That if
any premiums on said insurance shall not be paid when due all previous
premiums shall be forfeited to the company, except as provided in the
27. 258 Mo. 659, 167 S.W. 951 (1914).
28. 329 Mo. 651, 46 S.W. (2d) 523 (1932).
29. In the first place, the court did not quote verbatim, and in its original
context, the language of the contract specifically referring to subsequent premium
dates. It appeared that the policy might have been dated at the time of application
in order "to hold the applicant's age," which would have been a powerful argument
for the equity of insurer's position, but the court was not fully satisfied on that point
and, so far as the binder receipt was concerned, it by its terms only purported to
bind from the time of approval by the medical officer, which approval was given
after the change of insurance age. Finally, the binder receipt did not purport to
be a present contract of insurance but an agreement as to the date of the policy
which might be issued, and the policy issued contained two different dates of effectiveness, neither coinciding with that of the binder receipt. I am puzzled by absence
of any reference to "days of grace," so universally permitted today as to be assumed
in most cases, but which, if present in the principal case, would have been a complete and independent ground for the decision rendered.
30. See PATrERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (1935) p. 73.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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-policy.... That all premiums on any policy issued on this application shall
'be annual premiums. . . .This application and the policy hereby applied
-for taken together shall constitute the entire contract between the parties
'lereto." At the time of application, the applicant also executed a loan
-agreement in these words, "This certifies that the American Central Life
Insurance Company has issued to me a policy upon its fifteen payment
-.

. plan and has this day loaned me the sum of $61.40 to be used in pay-

ment of part of the first annual premium on the policy above mentioned
-No. 10,701, issued to me on the 24th day of May, 1906.... It is understood
nd agreed that should death of the insured occur at any time within fifteen
3rears from the date of said policy,

. .

.I hereby authorize the secretary of

,said company to insert in this loan agreement the date of the policy issued
-to me."
The court set forth the following recitations as the pertinent provisions
of the policy:
"The American Central Life Insurance Company

. .

.in consideration

of the agreements and warranties in the printed and written application for
this policy of insurance and of the loan certificate given the company, all
of which is hereby made a part of this contract, and of the payment in
advance of the sum of $307, hereby insures the life of Augustus C. Halsey
...for a period of one year. from the 24th day of May, 1906, and in consideration of the further payment in cash of $307 on or before the 24th
day of May and every year thereafter during the continuance of this policy
until fifteen full annual premiums shall have been paid, hereby promises to
pay ten thousand dollars to the insured's executors. .

.

.After this policy

-shall have been in force three years, it cannot be forfeited as hereinafter pro-vided. After three years' premiums have been paid ...this policy will be-come a non-participating paid-up policy for the amount stated in the table
-above the paid-up policy column for the end of the last year for which complete annual premiums have been paid.... After three full years' premiums
'have been paid should the holder hereof so elect within sixty days from date
,oflapse... the company will, on surrender of this, issue a non-participating
-policy for paid-up insurance for the full amount of this policy, to cease after
the number of years and months stated in the table above for the end of
the year for which complete annual premiums have been paid.... After the
policy shall have been in force three full years the company within sixty
.days after written request will in conformity with its rules then in force
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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loan up to the amount stated in the table above for the end of the last year
for which complete annual premiums have been paid . . . provided ...
(4) that the premiums must be fully paid to the end of the year in which
the loan becomes due. . . . If the insured be living and this policy is in
full force on the 24th day of May, 1921, the company will then pay to the
insured, or his assigns, the accumulated surplus ....
The payment of the
first annual premium hereon is a condition precedent to the taking effect
hereof and it is expressly agreed that this policy shall not become binding
upon the company until said premium is actually paid during the life time
and good health of the insured and that the delivery of this policy without
such payment shall not be a waiver of such precedent condition."
Before considering what the court said and held, it might be profitable
to make note of what it did not say. In the first place, it did not supply a
designation for the type of policy at issue, and from the portions quoted
it would be hard to supply a descriptive name with any confidence. It was
evidently not a whole life policy. It may have been a fifteen year endowment or a fifteen year term policy with investment features. One sentence
reads very like one year preliminary term insurance. The court evidently
was not concerned over the type of policy. In the second place, the issue
before the court was not when the non-forfeiture clauses took effect, or the
computation of the reserve. By no possibility of argument had the policy
been executed, issued or the insurance in effect for three years. Finally,
the word "ambiguous" nowhere appears in the opinion, but the word "clearly"
does.
The court held that the tender of the second premium on May 31, 1907
was timely, the policy not at that time having lapsed, that the refusal of the
tender was a waiver of prompt payment of the second premium, and that
the policy was in force at the time of insured's death. For this remarkable
result, these reasons were advanced. (1) Courts give a very liberal construction to insurance policies and never permit a miscarriage of justice (sic) by
a technical or narrow construction. (2) All the parts of the contract, policy
as well as application, must be construed together. (3) "Under the terms of
this contract, . . . the deceased was clearly insured for one full year from
June 5, 1906 to the last minute of June 4, 1907." (The court advances this
as a reason. It is obviously a conclusion for which no reason is given, and
is literally in direct contradiction of the language of the policy.) (4) The
act of the parties in paying and accepting the first premium on June 5, 1906
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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put a practical construction on the premium dates. (5) "If this is not the
true meaning of the parties then the appellant is driven to the conclusion
that the deceased paid for a full year's insurance, but under the terms of the
policy he was entitled to about eleven and one-half months of insurance.
This, nor any other court should allow an insurance company to thus stultify
itself after taking the premium for a full year, and then escape liability by
interposing the technical question that by the application for the policy the
insured agreed to pay the premium long before it was due." (Passing without.comment Judge Woodson's questionable rhetoric, it is apparent that the
assertion involves several prejudicial assumptions; it is also clear that it is a
definite alternative ground for the decision.)
During the next 18 years the several courts of appeals consistently
applied the doctrine that a full year's premium entitled the insured to a full
year's insurance, and that the date for payment of premiums was the anniversary of the date the insurance took effect. 1 (There was no doubt in their
minds what the Halsey case meant.) Only one of these cases was reviewed
by the supreme court. In State ex rel. MissouriState Life Ins. Co. v. Allen,"
the insured, who had been born Feb. 15, 1876, applied for insurance on Sept.
12, 1917. Insurer's agent told him that by dating back the premium to Aug.
14th, the premium would be lowered and the suggestion was followed. The
application, which was incorporated into the policy, provided that the insurance should not take effect until the first premium should be paid and the
policy delivered and accepted during the applicant's good health. The policy,
issued and delivered September 17, 1917, read, "This insurance is granted in
consideration . . . of the payment in advance of $68.20, being the premium
31. Stout v. Missouri Fidelity and Cas. Co., 179 S.W. 993 (St. Louis Court
of Appeals, 1915) (accident policy requiring "monthly premiums" payable in advance); Chestnut v. Securities Mut. Life Ins. Co., 232 S.W. 203 (Kansas City
Court of Appeals, 1921); Johnson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 249 S.W. 1.)
(Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1922), cert. denied (this case is discussed in te:t,
supra, at note 26); Newman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 S.W. (2d)
1015 (Springfield Court of Appeals, 1928); Hampe v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co.,
21 S.W. (2d) 926 (St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1929); Doty v. Western and Solithern
Life Ins. Co., 16 S.W. (2d) 712 (St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1929): Bigalke v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 34 S.W. (2d) 1019 (St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1931); Klinkhardt v. Crescent Ins. Co., 47 S.W. (2d) 210 (Springfield Court of Appeals, 1932).
Seinble: Fallis v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 243 S.W. 217 (Springfield
Court of Appeals, 1922); Lale v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of America, 275
S.W. 962 (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1925).
32. 295 Mo. 307, 243 S.W. 839 (1922). The case in the St. Louis Court of
Appeals was reported 234 S.W. 1042 (1921) sub nor Landrigan v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., and the opinion conforming to the mandate of the supreme court may
be found in 211 Mo. App. 89, 245 S.W. 382 (1922).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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for the first year's insurance under this policy ending on the 14th day of
August, 1918, which is term insurance. The insurance will be continued thereafter as whole life insurance upon the payment of the annual premium of
$62.80, on or before the 14th day of August, in every year during the continuance of this policy." Thirty one days of grace were allowed. The insured
died Sept. 26, 1918 without having paid any more premiums. Both the trial
court and the court of appeals held that the insurance was still in force at
his death, on the ground that the second premium was not due until the
anniversary of the delivery of the policy, and the days of grace carried the
insurance to the date of death. Said the supreme court en banc, "Under our
ruling in the Halsey case, insured had a full year's insurance from the delivery
and acceptance of the policy, regardless of the date of the policy . . . the
Court of Appeals followed the Halsey case and with light from the decision
of court in other states and the federal courts, reached and announced its
Until this court has ruled on the question
own decision on the question ....
the Court of Appeals has undoubted power thus to decide the question
authoritatively, whether or not we might reach the same conclusion."
Three salient facts were (1) the policy was ante-dated so that the
applicant might receive, and he did receive, a lower premium than that to
which he was entitled under the rules of the company on his age at the
actual time of application, whether or not it stated on its face that this was
done, (2) it was a one year preliminary term whole life policy and so stated
quite plainly, and (3) so far as the contract could control the premium date,
it stated in language about as plain as can be imagined that the premium
date was August 14th. The case illustrates what the lower courts were doing
under the Halsey decision and the language of the supreme court opinion
was certainly not calculated to discourage them. So far as the holding in
the highest court goes, it may be said that it was confined to the question
of conflict with prior supreme court decisions, and surely it doesn't conflict
with the Halsey v. Anerican Central Life Ins. Co., whether or not required
by that decision.
During this 18 year period only one case in which it could, with any
show of plausibility, have been argued that postponing the date of effective
insurance had the effect of postponing the subsequent premium dates, was
decided in favor of the insurer. In State ex rel. Winters v. Trimble3" the
33. 315 Mo. 1295, 290 S.W. 115 (1926). The case in the Kansas City Court
of Appeals is reported sub nom Winters v. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 290 S.W.
109 (1926).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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insured had held a straight life policy on which the premiums were admittedly
due on Feb. 17th. of each year. He had borrowed very heavily against the
reserve and had paid the premium due Feb. 17, 1916 by an additional note
secured by the reserve. On Jan. 22, 1917, faced by the imminent necessity of
paying another premium he did not have the cash to meet, as well as paying
the last premium note, he applied to the insurer for a substitution of a new
and different policy. The new policy was called a "single premium limitedpayment" policy, and required a large first premium and nine annual smaller
level premiums, when it would become paid up. As of the previous Feb. 17th,
the old policy had a surrender value of $1031.35. Outstanding was the old
indebtedness of 916.65 and the premium note of $125.60. The application
for the new policy was itself dated back to Feb. 17, 1916 and stated that the
substituted policy should bear that date. All computations were made as of
that date. Premiums on the substitute policy were calculated for insured's
age as of the previous February. The premium note given at that time was
cancelled without payment in any form. The indebtedness of $916.65 was
substracted from the surrender value of $1031.35, and the balance of $114.70,
plus $69.55 in cash, plus $1010 loan from the insurer (because of the large
first premium, the substitute policy carried immediate loan and cash surrender values) made up the first premium of $1194.25 on the substitute policy
dated Feb. 17, 1916. The policy was actually issued in Jan. 23, 1917 and
declared that it should not be effective until delivered to the insured in good
health and first premium paid. The insured died Jan. 11, 1918 without having
paid any additional premiums, specifically the one claimed by the company
to have been due on Feb. 17, 1917. The beneficiary contended, of course,'
that as the first annual premium on the substitute policy had been paid,
the insured was entitled to a full year's insurance from the date it became
effective, so that the policy was in force at the time of death.
The supreme court did not consider the decision for the insurer to
conflict with the Halsey or Allen cases. It was emphasized that those cases
dealt with original insurance whereas this was concerned with substitute
insurance, but the real point would seem to be that in such a case of substitute insurance the provision postponing the effective date of insurance could
not have the effect of depriving the applicant-insured of any period of coverage for which he was paying a premium. Although the original policy-the
piece of printed paper-may have been surrendered with the application for
the substitute insurance, inasmuch as the premiums up to that time had
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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been paid to keep it in force until Feb. 17, 1917, its insurance would still
cover the insured to the very moment when it was replaced by the newpolicy taking effect. There was no double payment of premiums, in as much
as the premium paid on the old policy on Feb. 17, 1916 was, in effect, refunded
through cancellation of the premium note. One can find no equities on behalf
of the insured justifying a strained interpretation of the language of the
contract.
The Trimble case was not regarded by the courts of appeals as involving
the Halsey doctrine as they understood it and they continued to find that
premiums subsequent to the first were not due until the anniversary of the
effective date of the policy.-" With Prange v. InternationalLife Ins. Co.,35
however, the tide began to turn. At the time of application (April 28, 1922),
insured was a few days closer to his next birthday than his last, a circumstance which required his premium to be calculated as of the higher age
The soliciting agent pointed out that a substantial saving in annual premiunr
could be made by ante-dating the policies some 24 days. When the policieswere delivered on May 18th, they bore date of April 4th and on receivingthem, the insured executed a supplementary application stating, "I desire
my policies to be dated April 4, 1922." The premium was appropriate forthe lower age. The policy contained a conventional clause postponing liability
until delivery in good health and payment of the first premium ". . . afterdelivery of this policy to the insured it shall take effect as of the 4th day of'
April, 1922." It was further stipulated, "This contract is made in consider-ation of the application herefor, which application is made a part hereof,.
and the payment of $700.75, constituting payment of premium for term,
insurance ceasing at noon on the fourth day of April, 1923, from which date
it may be renewed as an Ordinary Life policy by the payment of like sum
on said date and on each succeeding anniversary date of policy during the
lifetime of the insured." The question was whether the policy had lapsed'
for non-payment of a second premium prior to May 16, 1923.
The straightforward opinion of Ragland, J., holding that the policyhad lapsed, would not permit criticism if the case were truly one of first
impression. In substance, he said, (a) the policy in its inception was not
one for whole life but for a preliminary term positively declared to end on.
April 4, 1923 unless converted into an Ordinary Life policy at that time by
34. See note 31, supra, for cases decided between 1926 and 1932.
35. 329 Mo. 651, 46 S.W. (2d) 523 (1932).
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the payment of an additional premium, (b) there was no fraud or deception
practiced upon the insured, who was an experienced business man and must
bave understood the situation, (c) the insured might well have thought that
-a reduction in the premium he would have to pay for the rest of his life to
'keep the insurance in force outweighted the disadvantage of paying a full
Tear's premium for ten and a half month's insurance, (d) the law fixes no
-maximum charge for insurance, (e) the Arkansas law (the contract having
,been made in that state) does prohibit discrimination between policyholders
-with the same expectation of life, and such discrimination can be avoided if
the premium stipulated is to be charged a man of insured's age only by
ante-dating the policy.
If the language of the application and policy was clear, then reasons
(b) and (d) were sufficient for the decision. The trouble comes in reconciling
the Halsey case, where the court declared itself unwilling to allow a company
to charge a full year's premium for less than a year's insurance, apparently
announcing a rule of law. Of the Halsey case, Judge Ragland said, "Both
the facts and the policy provisions in the two cases are different. In the
former the policy was dated May 31, 1906, the date of its issuance, but was
-not delivered until June 5, 1906, when the first annual premium was paid.
-It
was held that, the entire contract considered, the parties intended the
,deceased to be insured for one full year from June 5, 1906 to the last minute
,of June 4, 1907. That case is not authority for the position taken by the
appellants in this." Having stated that the facts were different, the learned
judge proceeded to state facts which are certainly not remarkable, unless
-there was something peculiarly fateful about the date of June 5, 1906. It
is true that as one of the two grounds for the Halsey decision, it was found
-that there was an intention to contract for a full year's insurance, but the
court in 1932 as well as in 1914 could find intention only in the written
language and the circumstances under which it was employed. The reader
will have to compare the policy provisions for himself; I see very little
,difference to justify, let alone require, a different interpretation. That it was
a preliminary term policy which was involved in the Prange litigation (reason
(a) hardly seems material. "Preliminary-term" is simply the name given
-to a policy in which the accumulation of reserves is postponed. 8 Not only
is it not a true "term" policy in any sense, for the insurer's liability can be
36. See special note on "preliminary term insurance" at the end of this article.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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extended beyond the period regardless of his desire in the matter, but it
would be irrelevent if it were. The issue is not whether liability terminates
at the end of the term but what date is the end of the term. Term policies
do usually stipulate with some degree of definiteness and positiveness when
the term shall expire, and preliminary-term policies must use similar language
to differentiate themselves from ordinary life policies if they are to be freed
from the reserve requirements imposed upon the latter, but the question still
remains whether they have done so with sufficient clarity to defeat the
"'whole year's insurance for a whole year's premium" doctrine. Reading back
to the discussion of the Halsey case, we find that the company had there,
in consideration of the first premium, insured", . . . for a period of one year
from the 24th day of May", language not very different from that of
"preliminary term".
Judge Ragland's reason (c) is also irrelevant. The question is what
contract the parties made, or the law allows them to make, not the insured's
own estimate of probabilities or values.
Of his last point, it should be observed at the outset that there was no
difference between the Arkansas and Missouri statutes which would affect
7
the decision, either at the time of the Halsey, Allen, or Prange cases.
There was no mention of a change of insurance age in the Halsey case. (It
was present in State ex rel. Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Allen, but
so far as the supreme court is concerned, the force of that decision as precedent is limited.) It will be recalled that the Halsey case was distinguished
on the basis of intention. The appropriateness of the premium to the age of
the insured has very little to do with intention unless explained in the contract itself. It might very well have great force in restricting a rule of law
that an insured was always entitled to a full year's insurance for his first
premium no matter what his contract provided.
The lower courts did not immediately, universally, and unanimously
abandon the Halsey doctrine, 3 but they shortly began to follow the later
37. Discrimination in premiums between persons ofthe same life expectancies
is forbidden in Missouri. Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 6139; (1929) § 5729; (1939)
§ 5840.
38. McDonnell v. Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. of Des Moines, Iowa, 64 S.W. (2d)
748 (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1933); Kennedy v. National Accident and
Health Ins. Co., 76 S.W. (2d) 748 (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1934); Wilson
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 128 S.W. (2d) 319 (Kansas City Court of Appeals,
176
1939) (preliminary term insurance); Glosch v. Central Life Ins. Co. of Ill.,
S.W. (2d) 46 (St Louis Court of Appeals, 1943) (preliminary term insuranceinsured died one day after expiration of days of grace at end of "term" without
having paid second premium).
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9 It is not surprising that these cases do not
case as they understood it.a
automatically sort themselves or that they are not readily distinguished in
principle from the earlier courts of appeals decisions. In those decisions where
a full year's insurance for a full annual premium was not insisted upon, the
policies involved were usually term or preliminary term, this feature of the
Prange case supplying an obvious method of identification. However, the
unsatisfactory explanation of the distinction between the Halsey and Prange
cases on this ground, already pointed out, becomes more apparent when
one considers the actual language embodied in the contracts considered to
be essentially different from an ordinarly life policy. In Peterson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co..0 the insurance was "for the term of six months from
Feb. 19th, 1932.... This policy may, with the consent of the company, and
subject to all of the terms, conditions and provisions of this policy, be periodically renewed upon each successive expiration, for a further period of an
equal number of months, upon the payment of the premium herein stated,
as thepremium for each successive renewal.... Upon each such renewal, a
grace of thirty one days, without interest charge, shall be granted for the
payment of the premium, during which period the insurance shall continue
in force provided such payment is made within such period of grace." In what
way does such an agreement vary from an ordinary life policy with premiums
payable semi-annually? It is not a true renewable term policy, for the amount
of premium does not increase with age. It is not even effective to postpone
the accumulation of reserve, the real purpose of preliminary term whole life
insurance (and the premium being level, the accumulation of a reserve is
imperative), for the statutes authorizing preliminary term limit the period
of the term.41 If the question is one of law, there is certainly no reason why
the insured should not get as much insurance for his money under this type

39. Medlin v. American Banker's Ins. Co., 59 S.W. (2d) 738 (Springfield
Court of Appeals, 1933) (special interim insurance covered period between application and declared effective date); Petersen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 S.W.
(2d) 157 (St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1935); Evans v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of U.S., 109 S.W. (2d) 380 (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1937); Vail v. Midland
Life Ins. Co., 108 S.W. (2d) 147 (Springfield Court of Appeals, 1937) (the initial
premium was declared to be "for the first year's insurance . . . , which is term insurance, and for the legal reserve, if any," (!)italics mine); Hussey v. Ohio National
OLife Ins. Co., 119 S.W. (2d) 455 (St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1938); Lacy v. Am.
Central Life Ins. Co., 115 S.W. (2d) 193 (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1938);
Magers v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 191 S.W. (2d) 320 (Kansas City Court of
Appeals, 1945). Ashburn v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 197 S.W. (2d) 694
(St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1946) was decided under North Carolina law.
40. 84 S.W. (2d) 157 (Mo. App. 1935).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. 1939, § 5831.
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of policy as under an ordinary life policy. If the question is one of intent of
the parties as evidenced by their words, it becomes a matter of deciding
whether in this contract they indicated a different date for the payment of
subsequent premiums than in the Halsey case, or in the numerous cases
following it.
Should it make any difference whether the policy reads, "for a period
ending Jan. 15th, 1947", rather than, "for a period of one year from Jan.
15th, 1946"? I would think not, but the cases indicate that the insurer is in
a better position if it employs the former terminology.
The Petersen case seems to me impossible to square with Kennedy v.
National Accident and Healtkz Ivs. Co., 42 involving acident insurance on
a "month to month" basis.
In Vail v. Midland Life Ins. Co.,43 the policy denominated "preliminary
term" declared that the initial premium was "for the first year's insurance
under this policy ending on the second day of April, 1935, which is term
insurance and for the legal reserve, if any." As the whole point of preliminary
term whole life insurance is to avoid the accumulation of legal reserve during
the prelimniary term, the quoted declaration is very strange, 43 although the
policy went on to provide in clear language for the date of the payment of
subsequent premiums.
Possibly some of the cases cited above as adopting the Prange doctrine
(whatever that may be) are not really in point on the issue, despite the
court's reliance on that decision as its authority. Thus, in Medlin v. American
Bankers' Ins. Co.,44 the application made on April 24th provided that the
insurance, for which the annual premium was to be $47.82, should not take
effect and the premium not be payable until Nov. 9th. Apparently some
arrangement for interim insurance was made, for the policy delivered in June
carried a rider to the effect that, "In consideration of $10.68, the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, and in consideration of the promise to pay
the first annual premium, the insurance granted by such policy shall be in
full force and effect from the ninth day of May, 1923 to and including the
ninth day of November, 1923." Premiums were paid which, without controversy, carried the insurance at least to Nov. 9, 1928. Although there was
42. 76 S.W. (2d) 748 (Mo. App. 1934).
43. 108 S.W. (2d) 147 (Mo. App. 1937).
43a. Cf. McQueeney v. Nat'l Fid. Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 469, 166 S.W. (2d)
461 (1942).
44. 59 S.W. (2d) 738 (Mo. App. 1933).
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no insurance of any kind until delivery of the policy several weeks after
the date when, it was stated to take effect, the "short changing", if any,
occurred in the interim insurance which had expired by any construction
long before the litigation. Even though the Halsey case might be considered
to require the interim insurance to run until December to give the insured
full value, it does not follow that the principal insurance did not begin
November 9th, giving the insured who paid $47.82 on that date double
coverage for the balance of November. " Moreover, there was no explanation
of how the premium for the interim insurance was calculated, hence no
evidence that five months insurance was not full value for $10.68. In Evans v.
Equitable Life Ass. Soc. of U. S. 46 the suit was on a substituted policy
issued to reduce the amount of insurance, change the beneficiary, and to
change the premium-paying periods. The substitute policy was written and
issued on a date when the original policy was admittedly in force, purported
to adjust the accumulated reserve on the original and larger policy to the
smaller substituted policy and gave credit for the balance on the first
premium on the latter, and in accordance with such an adjustment set a
premium date on the substituted policy which did not coincide with the
premium date, application date, or delivery date of the first policy or the
application, execution, or delivery date of the substitute policy. Obviously,
a decision that the premiums on the substituted policy were due on the date
mentioned therein is not inconsistent with the proposition that the premiums
on the original policy were not due until the anniversary of its delivery, and
the court stated quite plainly that if the original policy had stood alone,
such would have been its decision. The judgment for the insurer was rested
primarily on the ground that the parties had interpreted the original contract
for themselves, by issuing and accepting a substituted policy calculated on
the basis of rights existing under the original contract if the premium dates
were as stipulated therein; partly on the ground that the substituted policy
was, in a sense, an accord and satisfaction of any dispute about the first
policy. The decision might also be rationalized on the theory suggested
previously, that as insured was truly covered at all times, even from the
ante-dated time of the substitute policy, there could be no question of his
getting full value for any premiums paid on it. Perhaps the original policy

45. Cf. Kennedy v. National Accident and Health Ins. Co., 76 S.W. (2d) 748
(Mo. App. 1934).
46. 109 S.W. (2d) 380 (Mo. App. 1937).
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was in force longer than appeared on the face of either policy, to give the
insured full insurance for the premiums paid on it, but even such extended
period had expired and the suit was only on the substituted contract.
In Biring v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.4 7 whatever premiums had been
paid at all were paid by insured's father at the time of application. The
application provided that if the initial premium accompanied the application,
the insurance should be effective from date of approval, otherwise from date
of delivery and payment. Insured died one year and 34 days after the
approval of the policy, one year and thirty days after delivery. As the insured
cannot postpone the date for payment of subsequent premiums by delay in
paying the first, at the same time claiming coverage, the insurance was either
never in force at all, or having taken effect from date of approval, expired
before insured's death. There was no real issue of the Halsey doctrine.
So much for the cases in the lower courts. So far as they are concerned,
the lines were drawn by the Halsey and Prange decisions and although in
their capable and earnest efforts to distinguish the two authorities the lower
courts took cognizance of the subsequent supreme court decisions on the
subject, they were not greatly helped by the later cases. While counsel
arguing before one of the courts of appeals must rely on or distinguish the
opinions rendered by that court, the fact is that the reader trying to ascertain
or rationalize "the law" in Missouri will find little in those cases which is not
necessarily superceded by supreme court opinions upon indistinguishable
facts.
3. Subsequent Maneuivers
48
In National City Bank of St. Louis v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.
the application for a five year term policy, made March 19, 1923, provided
if the first premium did not accompany the application, "the insurance shall
not be effective until the policy is delivered to and accepted by me and the
first premium thereon actually paid during my lifetime in continued good
health, but upon such delivery, acceptance and payment during my lifetime
in continued good health, the policy shall be deemed to have taken from
and shall bear the date of approval at the home office or other date specifically requested by the applicant, on which date each year thereafter subsequent premiums will be due and payable." The policy was dated March
19 (the application date) and was delivered by the local agent, with whom
47.
48.

129 S.W. (2d) 1086 (Mo. App. 1939).
332 Mo. 182, 57 S.W. (2d) 1066 (1933).
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the insured had a running account, on March 30, but the insured did not
pay the first premium to the agent nor did the agent pay the insurer on that
date. The policy provided for payment if death "shall occur within five
years from March 19, 1923 and while this policy is in full force" and declared
that it was issued" in consideration of the application ...

and the payment

in advance of $89, and of the payment of a like amount on the 19th day of
September, 1923, being the premiums for the first year's insurance under
this policy, ending on the 19th day of March, 1924. The insurance will be
continued thereafter upon the payment of a semi-annual premium of $89
on or before the 19th day of each of the months of March and September
in every year during the continuance of this policy, until premiums for five
policy years, including the first, have been paid." The agent paid the first
premium on May 23, 1923 and insured re-imbursed the agent on Jan. 2, 1924.
It does not appear how and when the subsequent premiums were paid, but
the premium falling due in the latter part of 1926 was never paid. Insured
died November 19, 1926 and his beneficiary contended that as the last
premium was not due until the semi-annual anniversary of the date of actual
payment of the first premium--.e. Nov. 23, 1926-the policy was still in
force..
The supreme court held for the insurer. It must be noted that to do
so, it was not necessary to give effect to the several statements in the policy
that premiums were payable on the 19th. If they were payable on the 30th,
the anniversary of delivery, the policy had lapsed. Among the several reasons
advanced for the decision, one was to the effect that the requirement of
pre-payment of the first premium, being for the benefit of the insurer, could
be waived and had been waived by the delivery of the policy and the acceptance of the insured's liability upon the agent's open account. While there
might have been room for argument over the agent's authority to make
such waiver (as well as the fact of intention to waive) if suit had been
brought upon the policy prior to any payment by the insured, the beneficiary
was in a poor position to contest the fact or validity of the waiver after the
unreasonable delay of the insured in retaining the policy and making tardy
settlement with the agent. In discussing this aspect of the case the court went
further than the facts required to state the the insured could not, by his
own tardiness in performing the condition of payment, prolong the liability
of the insurer. If the Halsey case still has any vitality, the question would
seem to be, did the insurance become effective prior to the payment? If not,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss2/1
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the insurer would still get full consideration for the insurance which took
effect later and lasted longer than the dates specifically mentioned in the
policy, except as the insured's "insurance age" changed during the period
of delay.
Two other facts were considered to distinguish the Halsey case. (1)
This was term insurance. (2) The Halsey case was one of construing ambiguities against the insurer who prepared the contract. There is nothing

ambiguous here, for the policy which provides for postponing the inception
of liability until payment of the first premium in the same sentence declares
that when the premium is paid at a date subsequent to the application, the
policy shall be effective from time of its approval and subsequent premiums
payable on the anniversary thereof. Of the first point it may be asked, as the
controversy arose before the five years had expired by any method of
computation, what difference does it make whether liability terminated five
years after the date of approval or five years after payment of the first
premium? The issue here is not the same as under the "preliminary-term"
policies, where it can be argued that delay in paying the second premium is
fatal because the so-called term has ended. However, in both types of cases
there seems to be the thought that the Halsey doctrine of a full year's
insurance for a full year's premium can not possibly operate to prolong
liability beyond the expiration of the stated (sic) term; so in this case it
would do no good to insist upon a full year's insurance for the first full
premium, because the insured would simply be squeezed at the other end.
The disiinction based on the difference between level premium term and a
whole life policy is not very satisfactory. Actuarially there is very little

difference between a 60 year level premium term policy and an ordinary
life policy, issued to a man aged 36. There seems to be little reason why a
premium on one policy shouldn't buy as much insurance as a premium on
the other. The best comment on the second point will be found by turning
back to the discussion of the Halsey case and reading Judge Woodson's exact
language as there reproduced under (5).
Scotten v. Metropolitai&Life Ias. Co. 49 was not very significant on
the broader aspects of the problem. The plaintiff did not introduce evidence
of the delivery date of the policy, other than that it was sometime after the
date of execution, so that there was little to justify a holding that the
admittedly unpaid premium was not due when the forfeiture was claimed
49. 336 Mo. 724, 81 S.W. (2d) 313 (1935).
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by the insurer. More to the issue which concerns us, the court found that
the parties by their conduct had interpreted the policy as claimed by the
insured. Payment on a quarterly basis as orginally required was changed at
the request of the insured to payment on an annual basis "beginning with
April 15th." Checks given for premium payments bore the notation, "for
premium due April 15th." On two occasions insured signed applications for
restoration of the policy because, in his own words, it had "lapsed for nonpayment of the premium due April 15th." Without intending to quarrel
with the particular decision, it might be proper to assert a caveat to the
application to this type of case of the sound and well-established rule which
gives great weight to the parties' own interpretation of their contract. No
sensible man waits to the last minute before paying his insurance premium.'
It is a well known fact that insured persons rely on the insurers to give
notice of premiums due and pay on the basis of such notices, usually giverr
from a month to a fortnight in advance, without much concern for the exact
date. The moment he is paying his premium is the last time at which it
might occur to him that a dispute over payment of a future premium would
arise, or that he might die at a moment when there was question of lapse for
non-payment of premium. If the matter did occur to him, would he want
to risk forfeiture by delaying payment or incur the expense of a test case,
in order to settle an issue which might well be moot? Under the circumstances,

insured's apparent acquiesence in insurer's assertion of the premium date as
evidenced by payment of premiums in accordance with notices given by the
insurer is hardly an expression of his real intention or understanding about
the contract. So far as an application for restoration or re-instatement of
the policy goes, might the force of the reference to the due date of the
unpaid premium not depend upon whether the application was made before or
after the anniversary of the date of delivery? If made before, particularly
if made upon the printed forms supplied and filled in by the insurer, much

of what has been said about the significance of "early" premium payments
is applicable. 5' If made after, of course the original policy had unquestionably
lapsed and the application is virtually an offer for a new contract, which
when accepted is supported by adequate consideration.
50. Our own supreme court has been as rigid as any in requiring the premium
to reach an authorized agent of the insurance company on time. Suess v. Imperial
Life Ins. Co., 193 Mo. 564, 91 S.W. 1041 (1906) (holding that the insured tool,
the risk of late delivery by the mails).
51. See Roberts v. American Nat'l Assur. Co., 220 S.W. 996, 999 (Mo. App.

1920).
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2
Tablet v. GeneralAm. Life Ins. Co..
contained facts raising substantial
equities for the insurer and it is doubtful if the actual decision for the insurer
did great violence to the Halsey case. The insured executed a blank application on Feb. 17, 1926, the form reading, "If the first premium is not paid
in cash at the time the application is made, or if a policy different from the
one described in this application is issued, the insurance shall not take effect
until the first premium thereon had actually been paid to and accepted by
the company, or its duly authorized agent, and the policy delivered to and
accepted by me during my life and good health; but in that event the policy
shall bear the date of its issuance and all future premiums shall become due
on such policy date and all policy values and extended insurance shall be
computed therefrom." The application showed insured's birth date as September 3, 1898 and his age as 27. It is apparent that for insurance purposes,
he could have been rated at "age 27" only if the policy were dated prior
to March 3, 1926. On that basis the policies were dated March 2, 1926 and
the application filled in to describe the policies, which were tendered insured
sometime in March. Preliminary term endowment policies for much more
than he had contemplated taking, the insured did not immediately accede
to the proposition, but retained the policies until May 26, 1926, when he
paid for the first premium. In the meantime, the premium had been charged
to him on his running account with the soliciting agent. The policies contained
the usual provisions referring to the end of the preliminary term and the

ultimate endowment period, all as on March'2nd and declared that it would
be kept in force by the payment of "the annual premium of $172.20 on or
before the Second Day of March in every year during the c6ntinuance of
this policy." Insured had his troubles keeping up premium payments and
there were several applications for re-instatement of the policies, containing

language similar to that of the Scotten case. The policy in suit finally lapsed
for non-payment of premiums and the case turned on the date of lapse,
the issue being the period of extended insurance to the purchase of which
the reserve was applied.
Taken as a whole, the language of policy and application could hardly
have been considered ambiguous. Possibly pre-payment of the first premium
had been waived by the agent (though it is hard to find any contract prior
to the actual payment by the insured, as the policies issued constitute a
52. 342 Mo. 726, 117 S.W, (2d) 278 (1938).
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counter-offer which the insured was "of two minds" about accepting).
Possibly-just possibly-an insured who accepts a policy tendered him
without prior application should be held to the consequences of ante-dating
more rigidly than one who has himself initiated the contract (though I can't
see why, aside from the probability that he reads the contract as written
more closely. In neither case is there any suggestion of fraud in fact, and in
both there is no insurance until the insured, with full opportunity of examining the policy, accepts delivery). Perhaps the insured had demonstrated his
acquiesence in the policy as written by his subsequent conduct. All these
points were made by Hyde, Commissoner. Most important was the fact of
change in insurance age, eliminating any equity in the contention that premium dates should recur from the date of acceptance by the insured in the
face of the clear language of the policy. Insured got full value from his money;
he got a better contract than if it had been written as of the date of inception
of the risk, with premiums calculated on his insurance age of that date.
On the element of fair value, the opinion goes on, "The principal basis
of the Halsey case seems" to be that unless the insurance continued for a
full year after the delivery of the policy then the insured did not get anything
for a part of his premium money. That could not be true here because, by
cutting down the first term paid for, Tabler did get something for that proportional part of his premium money. He got both a lower rate, throughout
the whole of his policy, and an earlier endowment maturity." It should be
borne in mind that an ordinary life policy is fully paid up at age 96, so that
it is really the same thing as an endowment policy for the number of years
between the insured's age at issue and 96. Therefore, the same argument
could be made of the whole life policy, that by antedating the inception of
risk the insured gets an earlier paid-up date. As the endowment policy involved in the Tabler case would not have matured until the insured attained
86 years of age, the comparison is not too fanciful. Moreover, if there is
validity in the argument based upon earlier endowment maturity, why does
it not cut both ways to require, of most of all policies, an extension of time
for premiums on term insurance, the darling of Prange case? An earlier
expiration of the term surely does not benefit the insured.
In the National City Bank case, quoted again in the Tabler case (and

later in Broadway Laundry Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co.) the "doctrine"
53. Understandably, the judge was not very positive about the basis of the
I4 alsey case.
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of the Halsey case was stated in these words, "If the policy provides for the
payment of premiums annually, semi-annually, or quarterly, on or before
certain days, occurring periodically after the date of the policy, and if the
policy (or application) further provides that it shall not take effect until
it is delivered and the first premium paid on a day subsequent to the date
(specified), then in the event of an issue of liability for want of timely payment of premiums, the premium paying periods are to be determined from
the date of delivery of the policy and payment of the first premium." 54 The
difficulty of distinguishing the several cases reaching an opposite result might
well cause one to wonder if the Halsey case had not been overruled in fact
if not in name. Any such conclusion must be revised promptly in the light
of the two appeals of Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., decided respectively by
Division 255 and Division 1" of the supreme court. The first appeal was
taken from a ruling on defendant's demurer to plaintiff's complaint, which
did not quote from the policy, so with an abbreviated recoid before it, the
court could not include the exact language of the contract in its opinion. The
second appeal was taken from a ruling on defendant's motion in the nature
of a demurrer to the evidence and the more elaborate record included the
policy itself. It appears that insured, who was an agent of defendant insurer,
had been born Dec. 31, 1887. He applied for insurance on June 29, 1932 (two
days before his age would have changed for insurance purposes) erroniously
stating that he had been born Dec. 31, 1886 and that his age was 45. The
policy which was dated June 28, 1932 and delivered sometime between July
1 and September 10 declared that it was made "in consideration of the
quarterly premium of fifty dollars and eighty cents to be paid to the company
on or before the 28th day of June, September, December and March in each
and every year for five years, and of the quarterly premium of ninety three
dollars and ninety cents payable under the same conditions thereafter, during
the lifetime of the insured," that it "should not become effective until the
first premium upon it is paid during the good health of the insured," and
that "if the age of the insured has been mistated, the amount payable hereunder shall be such an amount as the premium paid would have purchased
at the company's published rate now in use for the correct age." The first
premium was paid Sept. 10, 1932, in what manner does not appear. Pursuant

54. 342 Mo. at 733 (1938).
55. 346 Mo. 1062, 145 S.W. (2d) 113 (1940).
56. 350 Mo. 17, 164 S.W. (2d) 360 (1942).
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to notice that the next premium wduld be payable September 28th, insured
requested the company to charge it to his commission account, which was
done on Oct. 27th. No further premiums were paid and insured died April
5, 1933 within two quarters and 31 days from September 10th but not from
June 28th. The premiums required were those appropriate to a man of age
45 under the company's rates.
Both appeals were said to be ruled by the Halsey case, declared to have
been distinguished but never overruled. In discussing the Prange case and
those following it, no new distinctions were suggested, but the subsequent
interpretation of the ground for each of those decisions may be significant.
(a) Prange. According to Howard I, "There was an express agreement
that the date of the policy should be April 4th. The insured's insurance age
changed April 5th. He applied for insurance April 28th, after the change had
taken effect. The court held the contract of pre-dating so as to give the
insured a lower rate was based upon a valuable consideration and valid."
Howard 11 merely restated the facts and quoted from the Prange opinion
the portion that courts could not rewrite the contracts, the parties have
made for themselves.
(b) National City Bank. According to Howard I, "the same point as
the opinion in the Prange case.... In each case there was an express agreement as to the date the policy should be dated." According to Howard 1I,
"the insurer 'waived the prompt payment of the first' semi-annual premium,
and the policy 'took effect from its delivery on March 30, 1923'. It was held,
however, that the semi-annual premiums were due March 19 and September
19, as claimed by the insurer and that the plaintiff could not recover. The
court decided the case on 'the principles applied' to the Prange case ...
Also the fact that the policy was a term policy, as in the Prange case,
seemed 5" to be of consequence in ruling the case."
(c) Scotten. According to Howard I, "the conduct of the parties bound
them to the theory that the date of the policy controlled." According to
Howard II, there was a reasonable doubt as to the date the annual premium
was due and the court accepted the construction placed upon the policy by
the parties.
57. Commissioner Bradley, like Commissioner Hyde, "seems" a little uncertain. And what was the character of the Aetna policy in the Howard case? Presumably, it was not denominated "preliminary term" or "convertible term," but

there was to be a time when the premiums were to increase and the difference is
but one of degree between a fixed date for termination of all liability and a date for
termination of liability unless a higher premium were paid thereafter.
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(d) Tabler. According to Howard I, "the parties expressly agreed that
all further premiums should become due on the dates mentioned in the
policy; that the insured should have the benefit of policy values et cetera
on the basis of the date of the policy, which included the amount of the
premium on the basis of the insured's being twenty seven years of age and
not twenty eight, which was his insurance age when the policy became
effective by its delivery." According to Howard II, "the policy was issued
without any application being made, and it was held that the insured 'must
have decided to accept it on the basis of its terms'.
Significantly, attempts were also made to distinguish, rather than simply
to overrule, the several courts of appeals decisions cited under footnote 39,
s ra.
In the Howard cases, a good deal could have been made of the misstatement of age, by reason of which the premium was appropriate only if
the policies took effect after July 1st. No point was made of it at all. In the
first appeal, it was said to be a mere co-incidence. In the second, it was
declared to be "not important, so far as concerns the question as to whether
the policy was in force at the time of the insured's death." Instead of taking
this easy way of avoiding conflict with the anti-discrimination statute,
Division II said that the insured had not contracted wth respondent as to
the rate, or to date the policy prior to-July 1st. (This, of course, more or less
begs the question. It was being argued by defendant that acceptance of a
policy stating that premiums were due on June 28 made a contract to that
effect.) Division I spoke to the question of the statute by holding that the
provision adjusting the amount payable to the true age of the insured eliminated any possibility of discrimination. (Such a provision was also present
in the Tabler case, 8 which, in relying on the Prange case, pointed out that
anti-discrimination statutes existed in Missouri as well as Arkansas.) Just
possibly the evidence that insured was one year younger than he stated himself to be in his application was not totally convincing and the court preferred
not to rest its decision upon uncertain facts, but if that evidence was not
accepted, the decision goes squarely in the teeth of much language advanced
as the rationale of the National City Bank and like cases, where it was said
58. This clause is almost standard. One may suspect it was included in the
policies involved in other cases but not mentioned by the court. In analyzing a decision, we must take the facts recited by the court, but it is not without significance
that a court fails to include in its recital of facts, evidence which is in the record.
The plain inference is that the court regards it as immaterial.
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that the insured by his own delay in paying the premium should not be able
to obtain a more favorable construction of the contract and the advantage of
a lower premium rate than was appropriate for his age at the date of
payment.
In both appeals it was suggested that a policy effective only upon
delivery and payment differed from a policy effective upon payment only,
that payment as a condition precedent could be waived so that the policy
might be deemed effective from delivery in the former case, and insured
could not postpone subsequent premium dates by tardiness in performing
his part-the paying of the first premium. However, the difference which
is very real when there has been no delivery seems non-existent when the
insurer makes delivery without obtaining the premium. If delivery and
payment are two distinct requirements, why is the delivery a waiver of
pre-payment? If they are sufficiently related that delivery waives prepayment when both are stipulated to be conditions precedent to the inception
of risk, why not when only pre-payment is expressly declared a condition?
Most of the cases subsequent to the Halsey decision declared it to be
an example of construction of ambiguities against the insurer. As the Howard
appeals undertook to distinguish the Prange, National City Bank, Tabler,
and like decisions, consistent weight was given to the presence in the latter
policies of a clause expressly reconciling what might be deemed inconsistencies. 59 I do not see that such a clause really adds much to the policy
which says the same thing divided into two separate paragraphs, but if it
has any special meaning, it must be because without it, the policy which
declares the annual premiums due on the 24th day of May of each year is
nevertheless ambiguous. The clear holding of the two Howard cases was that
the policy before the courts was unambiguous. In the second appeal, it was
held thai evidence of the parties' construction was inadmissible, the meaning
of the contract being too clear.
McQueeney v. National Fidelity Life Ins.. Co. 0° was a long and complicated opinion on the computation of reserve values available for extended
insurance in the event of lapse. There were several independent reasons for
the decision by the court en banc in favor of the insurer. One of the alter59. That is, a provision that if the premium were not paid in advance, the
policy should not take effect until delivery and payment of first premium in good
health; but then, and in that event, it should bear the date of issue and premiums
be payable as of that date.
60. 350 Mo. 469, 166 S.W. (2d) 461 (1942).
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native grounds for judgment was that the policy lapsed on the anniversary
of the date of issue, despite the fact that it had not been delivered and did
not become effective until 22 days later. Insured was born December 28, 1873.
He applied for insurance July 13, 1923 when his "age, nearest birthday,"
was 50. The application provided that the policy should bear the date of its
approval at the home office "unless otherwise requested in statement Nine".
In the application, the "age, nearest birthday" was given as 49, and in the
space for statement Nine was written, "date policy June 28, to hold age."
Of this the court said, "In this case a specific date was agreed upon for a
specific purpose.... The purpose indicated by the application could only be
accomplished on the theory that the date of the policy controlled and
premium payments ran from that date. We hold that the evidence objected
to (evidence of the construction of the contract put upon it by the parties)
did not tend to vary any plain and unambiguous terms of the policy, and
was properly admitted."

The last shot was fired in Broadway Laundry Co. v. New York Life InCo.(" by Division 2 of the supreme court, and a disconverting salvo it was.
On June 19, 1934 insured applied for a seven year term policy, requesting
"date of policy as of date of application." He was then 53 years old but for
insurance purposes became 54 on June 23rd. The application provided "that
the insurance hereby applied for shall not take effect unless and until the
policy is delivered to and received by the applicant and the first premium
paid in full during his lifetime . .. provided, however, that if the applicant
at the time of making this application, pays the agent in cash the full amount
of the first premium for the insurance applied for ... and receives from the
agent a receipt therefor on the receipt form attached hereto, and if the company, after medical examination and investigation, shall be satisfied that the
applicant was, at the time of making this application insurable . . . then
said insurance shall take effect and be in force . . .from and after the time
this application is made, whether the policy be delivered to and received by
the applicant or not." The policy was delivered and the first premium paid
on July 2, 1934. The policy provided, "New York Life Insurance Company
agrees to pay... $10,000 upon receipt of due proof of death (insured) within
Seven years from the date this policy takes effect (hereinafter called the
term period). This contract is made in consideration of the application
61.

351 Mo. 278, 172 S.W. (2d) 851 (1943).
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therefor and of the payment in advance of the sum of $257.50, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, constituting the first premium and maintaining this policy for the period terminating on the 19th day of June, 1935,
and of a like sum on said date and every twelve calendar months thereafter
until premiums for seven full years shall have been paid from the date on
which this policy takes effect, or until the prior death of the insured. Thk
policy takes effect as of the 19th day of June, 1934, which day is the anniversary of the policy."
The quoted provisions contain every word of the application and policy
set forth in the opinion. The insured paid all seven "annual" premiums and
died on June 28, 1941. The court held that the policy expired June 19th,
1941, on the authority of the Prange case. The Halsey case and those like it
were said to rest upon construction of ambiguities not present here. Moreover, they were all whole life policies while this is a term policy.
The opinion makes no reference to the method of calculating the premiums. We may presume they were appropriate to age 53 rather than age 54.
The court might well establish a positive rule that delay in the inception
of the risk should not prolong the risk where the postponed risk would be an
increased risk for which adequate premiums were not paid. Such a rule
would do no great violence to the Halsey authorities, although it might be
,observed that the necessary but arbitrary calculation of premiums on an
annual basis does not mean that mortality risks do not always increase with
increased age, whether or not a birthday anniversary happens to recur during
-the particular passage of time. But when the court undertakes to distinguish
this case from the Halsey and Howard cases, and the many courts of appeals
-cases, on the basis of certainty of language and of term provisions, how can
a lawyer advise his client? I said at the beginning of the article that one
-of the major difficulties was ascertaining what was the court's conception of
ambiguous language, and I think I have demonstrated that it is impossible
to predict the treatment of any case. Bear in mind that the issue of the
Broadway Laundry case was not the date of premiums but the date of
expiration of the term. The court quoted no explicit statement in the policy
that the term expired June 19th, 1941. All that the quoted portions of the
policy contained on this point was in the promise to pay upon proof of death
"within Seven years from the date this policy takes effect." At the most it
can be said that the policy contained two absolutely inconsistent provisions
in regard to the date it took effect. One clause declared that it took effect
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from the date of delivery and receipt by the applicant, the other stated that
it took effect "as of" (not "from") June 19th. Moreover, the net result is
that the insured is put in the same position as if he had paid the premium
in advance and accepted a binder receipt, which alternative he did not
choose. Aside from the equities resulting from the change in insurance age,
and regarding only the language of the policies, this case seems to me a far
stronger one for the beneficiary than Halsey v. American Central Life Ins.
Co., State ex. rel. Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Allen, or Howard v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co.
4. Retreat from Drawn Battle
If the policy is one for a term, or is a preliminary term policy; if it
provides that it shall not take effect until delivery and the payment of the
first premium in good health, but shall then be deemed to have taken effect
as of the date of issue (all this being in the same sentence); if the policy
states that it is issued in consideration of the first premium, for which
insurance is given until a named date, which is the anniversary of the date
of issue, and in consideration of subsequent premiums payable on that same
date in each succeeding year; if the applicant's insurance age has increased
between the date of the policy and the date on which the first premium
was paid (particularly if the policy was delivered prior to the payment of
the premium and particularly if the application, executed after the change
of insurance age, states that the policy shall be pre-dated to hold age); if the
insured has for several years paid the premiums on the anniversary of the
date of execution of the policy and by various written statements recognized
that date as the premium date; if all these elements are present, then under
the Missouri authorities it would appear that premiums after the first are
payable on the anniversary of the date of issue. Eliminate any one of these
facts and the outcome is unpredictable.
The present situation is quite advantageous to the bar. It reminds one
of the lawyer's best friend, the jolly testator who draws his own will. The
court might over-rule the Halsey and Howard cases, thus eliminating the
confusion which breeds litigation. That situation would be quite advantageous
to the insurance companies. I can not conceive of the court over-ruling the
Tabler case. I do think it would be possible to preserve the precise rulings
of most of the supreme court decisions by frankly rejecting a great deal of
the language in the opinions and by adhering to a rule of law that, regardless
of the language of the contract, the insured was entitled to a full year's
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insurance for a full annual premium, except where, by reason of change
of insurance age between the date of policy and the date on which it takes
effect, the premium stipulated would under the established rates of the
insurer, be inadequate for the face amount of the policy at the attained age
of the insured.

SPECIAL NOTE ON PRELIMINARY TERM INSURANCE

The mortality tables give us the percentage of any group of individuals
of a given age who will die during each succeeding year. The natural cost

of life insurance is simply the quotient obtained by dividing the total amount
of death benefits to be expected in a particular year according to the mortal-

ity table by the number of policyholders paying premiums at the beginning
of that year (assuming all parties are of identical insurance age and hold
identical policies). Because a larger percentage of that group will die each
succeeding year, thus increasing the dividend in relation to the divisor, the
quotient, or natural premium, increases with each year of age. The premium
for a one year term policy is simply the natural premium, discounted to
compensate for the use of the money by the insurer during the period between
the time it is received at the beginning of the insurance year and the time it
is paid out for death benefits (i.e. on the average, half a year), and loaded
with the administrative expense of the insurer. And in renewable term insurance, as each year's coverage must pay for itself, the premium mounts
with each succeeding year until, at age 95 (if such insurance were to be
written) the premium would equal the benefit payable under the policy,
subject only to discount and loading.
Renewable term insurance might be written on a whole life basis,
although almost universally it is not because after, say, 60 years, the adverse
selection of risks becomes so marked as to upset the experience tables on
which the premiums were calculated. (The healthy, with prospects of long
lives, drop out in the face of the mounting premiums; only the poor risks
stay on.) Whole life insurance, then, as a practical matter is written almost
exclusively on a level or a limited premium basis. Unlike the situation in
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one year term insurance, the insurer is not here primarily concerned with
the number of death benefits he must pay; it is inherent in the plan of
insurance that ultimately he must pay the full death benefit on every life in
the group. The significance of the mortality table now is that it discloses how
many premiums can be expected from the entire group, payable at the beginning of each year, during the entire period that any of them is alive. (It is
obvious that all will pay the first premium, only those who survive the first
year will pay the second, only those surviving the first two years will pay the
third, etc). With the total number of premiums to be expected thus ascertained, the calculation of the level premuim is exactly the same as in the
term policy. The total death benefit (the number of policy holders multiplied
by the amount of the policy) is divided by the number of premiums expected
from all members of the group during their lives. As the period between
receipt of premiums and payment of death benefits is more extended, giving
the insurer greater use of the money, the discount to compensate for that
use becomes more important, and here the experience table must again be
referred to to calculate the period. The final result may be called the net
level annual premium for a whole life policy. The important thing to bear
in mind is that the insurer does not take the risk of any single life as a
contract unrelated to his other risks. He does not calculate the premium
on the basis of the "life expectancy" of the individual applicant, charging
more than the natural premium during the early years of the contract to
build up a reserve out of which deficiencies in the later years could be made
up. (If he did that, the cash surrender value of the policy would decrease
in later years, whereas in fact it increases every year to death.) From the
insurer's standpoint, each policy holder is but one member of an indefinitely
large group of persons identically situated, and, the net premium is calculated
to bring the insurer out exactly even on the group as a whole. (Insurers work
on the precept of Wilkins Micawber, that income must balance expenditure,
but practice the theory more faithfully than did he.) The reserve which is
attributable to any policy (the accumulation of which by the insurer is
absolutely essential to his breaking even on the total group) is thus composed
not so much of the excess of premiums over natural premiums which has been
paid on that policy as it is composed of the excess over natural premiums
theretofor paid on the policies held in the group by those who have died. That
is why the reserve constantly increases until the last survivor in the group
has, at age 96, a fully paid up policy. (The argument advanced in GILBERT,
LIFE INSURANCE-A LEGALIZED RACKET (1936), is absolutely fallacious from
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an actuarial standpoint. On the basis of present rates, no insurance company
could possibly pay both the face amount of the policy and the accumulated
reserve on that policy at the time of death. However, the book is not without
value in calling attention to the frequently disregarded merits of term insurance.)
The administrative and selling costs of the insurance company must
be added to the net premium to give the gross or actual premium charged.
Some of the costs are incurred throughout the life of the policy-such as
general overhead of the company, of which each policy must bear its part, the
management of investments, the mailing of premium notices, etc. Certain
special costs are incurred at the death of the policyholder. The greater part
of the total costs are incurred at the inception of the policy. The simplest and
most logical procedure would be to add them to the first premium, but
either to preserve the form of level premiums or to conceal the amount of
the soliciting agent's commissions, that is never done. The total expense
attributable to the policy is estimated, it is divided by the number of premiums expected to be paid, and the resulting figure added to the net premium.
This means, of course, that from other sources the company must find the
means of carrying the initial expense of the policy until it is made up from
the later premiums, a matter of some concern to smaller or newer companies
if not to the old and established insurers with their gigantic surpluses.
The so-called preliminary term policies were devised to meet this problem. The theory may best be explained by reference to typical cases. On
the basis of the American Experience Table, and using a 3%o discount rate,
the net premium on an old line whole life policy at age 35 is $21.08, at age
36 is $21.74. The natural cost for one year's term insurance at age 35 is $8.68.
(Calculated as stated on the basis of the American Experience Table, this
disregards both the fact that the Experience Table is somewhat out of date
and the more important fact that a practice of selecting risks makes the
actual cost to the insurer considerably less, especially in the first year when
the factor of selective risks has its greatest influence.) The significance of
each of these figures has been explained. So far as the whole life premiums
are concerned, it should now be clear that the difference of 66 cents results
from the fact that in the group of lives being insured at age 36, there is
one less year in which the insurer can collect the total amount in premiums
to make up the death benefits he must pay out-or to put it another way,
because at the higher age the policy holders will die more rapidly, there will
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be fewer premium payments from which to make up the necessary sum.
Because the reserve allocated to any policy in force consists primarily of
"excess" premiums collected from policy holders who have died, the reserve
on the policies issued at age 36 will accumulate faster than the reserve on
otherwise similar policies issued at age 35. On either policy, the reserve at age
95 will be exactly the face amount of the policy less one year's premium.
As a matter of contract law, the ordinary whole life policy is not regarded
as insurance for one year, with a perpetual option in the insured to renew
by the payment of another premium at the beginning of each year. The
contract of insurance is considered single and entire, payment of premiums
after the first being merely performances of conditions subsequent. From a
functional standpoint, however, it makes not the slightest difference how you
analyze it. The amount of death benefits the insurer must pay out, and the
amount he must collect in premiums, remains the same in either case. So
an insurer who issues a one year term policy at age 35, convertible at the
option of the holder into a whole life policy at the end of the year, is under
exactly the same potential liabilities as if he had issued the whole life policy
at age 35 in the first instance. (The only difference in practice is the effect
on risk selection through a premium change at the end of the year.) He
ultimately must collect at least as much in premiums. So if he charges the
regular term insurance rate for the first year ($8.68 net), he must make it
up by charging level premiums on the converted policy at least 66 cents
higher than on the whole life policy issued at age 35.
The figures given have been for net premiums. The administrative
expense on the convertible policy is the same as for the whole life policy.
Suppose our insurer, disregarding the legal point that the convertible policy
creates two contracts, regards it all as a single liability on which he will add
his overhead. He can either divide the overhead into equal installments and
add the same amount to each premium, in which case there will still be a
$13.06 jump between the first and subsequent premiums (the difference
between net term premium plus loading and net whole life premium at age
36 plus loading), or he can (a) deduct $13.06 from the total estimated
administrative expense to be charged against the policy, (b) divide the
balance by the number of anticipated premiums, (c) add the quotient,
which is his loading charge, to $21.74, and (d) charge a gross premium of
$21.74 plus loading charge for every year, including the first term year. When
he does this, we have the so-called one year preliminary term whole life
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policy. The insurer has taken a total of $13.06 out of loadings on subsequent
premiums (the reduction in loading on each being 66 cents) and has added
it to the loading on the first premium, where it, in addition to the same
loading as is put on the subsequent premiums, can be used to defray initial
expense, and by postponing the accumulation of the reserve, he has not
affected the soundness of his contracts. The gross premium charged is the
same as for a whole life policy at age 35. The insurer's shifting around of net
premiums and loading charges is hidden in the level gross premium and the
only clue to the insured of what has been done is the designation of the policy
as one of preliminary term and a different table of reserve or surrender
values, neither of which he understands.
Preliminary terms of not more than one year, subject to limitations not
here relevant, are permitted by Mo. REv. STAT. 1939, Sec. 5831, Missouri
Laws 1943, p. 599. It has been held that the Missouri non-forfeiture statute
guaranteeing to the owner of a whole life policy not less than three fourths
the value of the reserve of a similar policy computed on the actuaries or
combined experience table at 4%, in case of default in premiums after three
years, should be applied to preliminary term policies only after four premiums had been paid, on the ground that there was no reserve at the end of
the first year. Doty v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 192, 165 SW (2d)
862 (1942). I went on record as sharply criticizing this decision when it was
rendered (8 Mo. L. REv. 271) but after reflection, I am convinced the court
was absolutely right and I was wrong. Any other decision would nullify the
statute authorizing such preliminary term insurance, which must therefore
be considered to have modified the non-forfeiture stature. Directing my
attention too exclusively to the latter statute, which was the one immediately
under construction, I took issue with the court's argument that by definition
there was no reserve for the first year because it was term insurance. That
seems to me to beg the issue. Regardless of what he calls it, the insurer is
under potential liability for the insured's whole life, as he has no control
over the insured's power to keep the insurance in force by subsequent payments of premiums of identical amounts. In other words, it is not true
one year term insurance, for which there is no need of reserve because the
insurer's liability is ended when the term ends. Where the liability may
continue, the insurer must either increase the premiums to take care of the
increasing mortality rate, as he does in renewable term or convertible term
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insurance, or he must provide a reserve from the first year's premium to offset
-the increased natural cost of the insurance in subsequent years, if he is to
remain solvent. The question was whether the non-forfeiture statute does
not require the use of the second method, when he charges a level gross
-premium. Taken alone, I thought-and think-it does, but in conjunction
with the authorization for preliminary term policy, I acknowledge it does not.
The insurer may use the first method, but conceal the increase in net
-premiums in the level gross premiums.
It may be pertinent to point out in this very brief discussion of the
-calculation of premiums and reserves that the premiums on a whole life
policy, 60 year endowment policy, 60 year term policy (level premium basis),
-and 60 payment whole life policy issued to a man, aged 36, would be exactly
the same. In fact, the rights under each policy would be exactly the same
,except for the very slight possibility that he might "outlive" the mortality
table, in which case the term insurance would not cover his death. Hence,
insurance companies do not offer such a selection. The whole life policy covers
:al the needs of a 36 year old applicant who is willing to pay 60 premiums.
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